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Abstract
In the current study, we hypothesize that post-error performance is influenced by 
individual differences in action orientation and situationally induced regulatory focus. 
Two experiments employing a time pressured flanker-like task, measured 
participants’ dispositional action orientation and manipulated regulatory focus. As 
expected, accuracy of the responses following errors was reduced for all participants 
except for action-oriented participants in a promotion focus. The latter participants 
are assumed to down-regulate error-related negative affect, thereby saving 
resources for subsequent performance. A promotion focus is assumed to facilitate 
the optimal use of these resources. 
Keywords: Post-error performance, action orientation, regulatory focus, errors
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“Errare Humanum Est”
- Seneca
Making mistakes can be very unpleasant, yet it happens to all of us. As the 
quote from Seneca in the motto above aptly states: To err is human. Consolation 
may be found in the suggestion that it is often not the mistake but the response to the 
mistake that matters. In this light, it seems unfortunate that mistakes tend to bring 
about more mistakes. Surprisingly, behavioral scientists rarely investigate the impact 
of erroneous responses on subsequent performance. Furthermore, little is known 
about why some people appear to suffer less from making mistakes than others. In 
the current paper we investigate how a dispositional manner of dealing with stressful 
situations combined with an individual’s motivational orientation interact to overcome 
the detrimental influence that making a mistake may have on subsequent 
performance.
The origin of poor performance following mistakes may be found in a lack of 
cognitive resources available for post-error processing. Following an error, even 
though a response has already been given, the brain continues task processing (see 
also Kleiter & Schwarzenbacher, 1989). The resulting diminution of cognitive 
resources leads to suboptimal performance, such as slower or less accurate 
performance on subsequent tasks. Research has demonstrated that post-error 
responses are indeed characterized by slowing (Rabbitt, 1966, see also Fairweather, 
1978) and inaccuracy (Rabbitt & Rodgers, 1977; see also Jentzsch & Dudschig, 
2009). These effects have mainly been found in speeded response tasks, but there is 
some evidence of post-error slowing in the slower paced judgments of verbal 
analogies (Kleiter & Schwarzenbacher, 1989). 
In what way the lack of resources impairs post-error performance (slowing, 
error-correcting responses, inaccuracy, etc.) depends on the specific task that is 
being performed. For example, in paradigms employing tasks with a small inter-trial 
delay but no time pressure, we may expect slowing following errors. People normally 
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strive to give correct answers and take more time to be able to give these answers 
following errors. Inaccuracy seems more likely in tasks with inherent time pressure. 
Given time pressure, post-error slowing may not be an option, in which case 
deteriorated post-error processing is likely to enhance incorrect responding. 
Related to this reasoning is the notion that making an error is accompanied 
by aversive affect (e.g., Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000; Hajcak & Foti, 2008; Luu, 
Collins, & Tucker, 2000; see also recent research on unintentional processing of 
motivational valence by Moors, De Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 2005). The negative 
affect activated by making an error may cause problems with the attentional 
disengagement from the erroneous trial (Van der Wulp, Semin, Galucci, & 
Finkenauer, 2009), thereby explaining the diminished resources in the following trial. 
This is not to say that activation of negative affect is dysfunctional. On the contrary, it 
may well be very functional as it provides a cue for detailed, bottom up processing 
(see e.g., Bless & Schwarz, 1999), which may be needed for a careful analysis of the 
committed error in certain tasks and situations. However, this mode of processing 
proves detrimental in situations requiring rapid changes in behavioral responses or 
speeded response tasks. 
Given that an error activates negative affect, the manner in which an 
individual is able to efficiently regulate negative affect may predict the amount of
attentional distraction from the performed task that he or she is subject to. Individual 
differences in dispositional cognitive and affective dynamics within the individual may 
thus be particularly important in dealing with errors under time pressure. A theory of 
self-regulation that focuses on these dynamics and more specifically on the 
regulation of affect is the theory of action orientation (Kuhl, 1981; 1994a). The theory 
of action orientation differentiates between a state-oriented and an action-oriented 
mode of behavioral control. We think that the consequences of making a mistake for 
performance on a task are dependent on the dispositional action or state orientation 
of the individual committing the mistake. 
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The action or state orientation of an individual is comprised of an over-learned 
set of routines used to cope with demanding situations and the aversive affect that 
accompanies them. Action-oriented individuals are characterized by down-regulation 
of the aversive affect evoked by stressful events and rapid mobilization of cognitive 
control resources. State-oriented individuals on the other hand, tend to ruminate on 
negative events. It is assumed that “state-oriented individuals will respond to stressful 
conditions with persistent negative affect, negative rumination and inhibited self-
regulation” (Koole & Jostmann, 2004, pp. 975-976).1 Research has indeed 
demonstrated that following failure in a training phase, performance decrements on a 
complex cognitive task were found for state-oriented, but not for action-oriented 
participants (Kuhl, 1981). Likewise, induction of stress leads to diminished cognitive 
control among state-oriented individuals, but not among their action-oriented 
counterparts (Jostmann & Koole, 2007). Furthermore, the down-regulation of 
negative affect responsible for these differences in performance was demonstrated to 
occur only for action-oriented individuals in demanding contexts (Koole & Jostmann, 
2004).  
Thus, in relatively stressful situations (e.g., fast paced tasks), action
orientation theory predicts different reactions to committing an error. Due to 
difficulties in down-regulating the accompanying negative affect, state-oriented 
individuals are inclined to ruminate about their mistake, thereby hampering post-error 
performance (see also Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007). Action-oriented individuals 
disengage from their mistake by the effective down-regulation of the associated 
negative affect and are able to perform post-error behavior relatively normally. 
However, this dispositional difference in dealing with errors is only part of the picture. 
Next to the stable ways of handling stressful situations, people are continuously 
influenced by temporary, more dynamic motivational factors.
Among motivational theories, the pleasure principle is thought to be one of 
the most basic forces guiding behavior. This principle entails that people approach 
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what they desire and avoid what appears threatening. This basic mechanism has 
lead to a substantial amount of research demonstrating that positivity is associated 
with approach movements and negativity with avoidance movements and vice versa 
(e.g., Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 1993; Chen & Bargh, 1999; Solarz, 1960). 
These movements or bodily orientations may also be construed as fitting a higher 
order motivational system, described by regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997). This 
theory posits that (goal directed) behavior is guided by either a promotion or a 
prevention focus, which influences a host of cognitive processes. Regulatory foci 
have been shown to influence (among others) the interpretation of affective states 
(Shah & Higgins, 2001), the amount of attention dedicated to valenced stimuli (De 
Lange & Van Knippenberg, 2007), creativity (Friedman & Förster, 2001) and the 
effects of success and failure feedback on motivational strength (Förster, Grant, 
Chen Idson & Higgins, 2001).
Although people may differ as to which focus is preferred chronically, both 
foci are present in our behavioral repertoire and situational cues have been shown to 
activate the suitable regulatory focus in a wide variety of both judgmental and 
behavioral tasks (see e.g., Higgins & Spiegel, 2004, for a review). The focus that is 
activated is usually one fitting the specific situation, in terms of response strategy or 
processing style. In a promotion focus, people aim for gains, nurturance and there is 
a general eagerness to score results. In this focus, people tend to use approach 
means and “risky” response strategies or processing styles. In contrast, people in a 
prevention focus are concerned with (preventing) losses, security and are vigilant 
with regard to failure. In this motivational focus, the emphasis is on avoidance means 
and a more conservative response strategy. In general then, making an error should 
be more aversive for people in a prevention focus. 
However, the extent to which action and state orientated individuals are able 
to effectively use their regulatory foci may differ, especially when regulation of affect 
that follows errors is involved. First, although state-oriented individuals are able to 
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activate both promotion and prevention foci, their affect regulation skills may cause 
difficulties in certain situations. People with a dispositional state orientation are 
chronically over concerned with the mistakes they make, even in conditions in which 
their focus is on gaining rewards (i.e., a promotion focus). The negative affect 
accompanying mistakes leads to rumination, thereby interfering with the eager 
response strategy activated by a promotion focus. Thus, state-oriented individuals 
can be motivated to look for hits, but they are dispositionally constrained to reflect on 
losses as soon as they occur. For state-oriented individuals then, performance 
following errors in fast paced response tasks will be hampered irrespective of which 
regulatory focus is active.
Action-oriented individuals are more flexible with regard to the influence of 
motivational orientations in these situations. The action orientation ensures the 
individual of the down-regulation of the negative affect associated with making errors 
and freeing up resources to help task performance. An active prevention focus with 
its loss-aversive, vigilant response strategy makes the action-oriented individual 
more cautious following an error, thereby slowing or hampering post-error 
performance, especially in time pressured tasks. However, a promotion focus 
complements the action orientation by providing an eager response strategy, putting 
to work the available resources. Thus, only the conjoint occurrence of both an action 
orientation and a promotion focus will lead to optimal performance following errors in 
situations where speeded responses are required. 
The present research
The present research was designed to specifically investigate the behavioral effects 
of making a mistake in a time-pressured task. We hypothesize that post-error 
performance will be hampered (compared to post-correct performance), except for 
action-oriented individuals in a promotion focus. In two experiments, participants 
performed a cognitively demanding task wherein regulatory focus was manipulated 
using different procedures. 
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Since the present research is concerned with errors, we expect to find effects 
of action orientation as measured by the failure related subscale (AOF) of the Action 
Control Scale (Kuhl, 1994b). The AOF scale is thought to specifically measure the 
ability to down-regulate negative affect once it is aroused (see also Baumann, 
Kaschel & Kuhl, 2007; Kuhl, 1994a).
Experiment 1
Method
Participants and design. Sixty-one students (46 female) from the Radboud 
University of Nijmegen participated and received 1 or 2 euros (see below) as 
compensation. The design of the experiment was a 2 (result of previous trial: correct 
vs. incorrect) x 2 (regulatory focus: promotion vs. prevention) x 2 (AOF: action vs. 
state) mixed design. Result of the previous trial was a within-subjects factor whereas 
regulatory focus and action orientation were between-subjects factors. The 
dependent measure consisted of the proportion of correct responses on the current 
trial.
Experimental task. The task used in this experiment is based on the Eriksen 
Flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), which is commonly used to investigate error-
related processes. In the classic flanker paradigm, participants are presented with a 
string of five symbols or letters (e.g., <<><< or SSHSS) and are asked to indicate 
what the middle symbol is (in these examples > and H). The symbols surrounding the 
middle symbol are irrelevant to the task, but do influence the speed and accuracy of 
responses. A match between the flankers and the middle, target symbol heightens 
accuracy and leads to faster responses than a mismatch. The task we designed for 
the current experiment required a similar, but more complex processing of the 
flanking stimuli.2 Participants were presented with a grid of 3 x 3 letters (S and H) and 
were asked to indicate whether or not the middle, target letter corresponded with 
three of the four corner letters. Examples of the letter grids that were used in 
experiment 1 and 2 are presented in figure 1. All grids consisted of the letters S and 
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H (nine letters in total, four of one letter, five of the other), and there was either a 
match or a mismatch between the target and three corner letters. The grids were 
presented randomly with respect to their configuration, target letter and match. 
Matching and mismatching grids were presented equally often for both target letters. 
There was no influence of the target letter (S or H) on any of our analyses; this 
variable will therefore not be discussed any further.
Each letter grid was preceded by a fixation point for 400 ms, and was 
presented to the participants for 900 ms. The presentation ended after a response 
was given or after the 900 ms. expired. A response was given by pressing one of two 
marked keys on the keyboard (the “A” and “6” key on the numerical pad”) that 
corresponded with either a mismatch or match between the target letter and three 
corner letters. Upon completion of each trial, participants received feedback on their 
performance. One of three types of feedback was displayed on the screen, 
depending on the performance of the participant. Either the word “goed” (correct) in 
the color green, “fout” (false) in red or “te laat” (too late) in blue. This feedback 
remained on the screen for 1000 ms, followed by an inter-trial interval of 1500 ms. 
Procedure. Upon arrival in the laboratory, participants were seated in 
individual cubicles containing a computer. On the computer screen, detailed 
instructions regarding the experimental task were presented and participants were 
shown examples of experimental trials. Following the instructions, participants were 
presented with 20 practice trials to familiarize themselves with the experimental task 
and to practice responding within the 900 ms. response window. 
Upon completion of the practice trials, half of the participants received 
instructions that induced a promotion focus, the other half received instructions 
inducing a prevention focus. The promotion focus instructions were: “You will receive 
one euro for this experiment, however: If you score amongst the 20 percent of all 
participants until now who make the smallest number of errors, you will win one extra 
euro! If you do not score amongst the 20 percent who make the smallest number 
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errors, you will not win an extra euro.” The prevention focus instructions were: “You 
will receive two euros for this experiment, however: If you do not score amongst the 
20 percent of all participants until now who make the smallest number of errors, you 
will lose one euro! If you do score amongst the 20 percent who make the smallest 
number of errors, you will not lose one euro.” Similar instructions have previously 
been validated and used to induce regulatory focus in several studies (e.g., De 
Lange & Van Knippenberg, 2007; Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997).
The experimental trials followed the induction of regulatory focus and 
consisted of two blocks of 60 trials, each preceded by four practice trials. In-between 
the two blocks, participants were shown their results so far (number of correct, false 
and too late responses) and presented with the promotion or prevention instructions 
as a reminder. Following the experimental trials, participants were asked to answer 
some demographic questions and to fill out a Dutch translation of the AOF subscale 
of the Action Control Scale (Kuhl, 1994b). Since action and state orientation are 
thought to be mutually exclusive, participants were coded as either predominantly 
action-oriented or state-oriented (cf. Kuhl, 1994b). The conceptual midpoint of the 
AOF scale (which corresponded with a median split on the scale) was used to code 
participants. Participants who gave six or more action-oriented responses were 
coded as action-oriented, participants who gave less than six action- oriented 
responses were coded as state-oriented. 
At the end of the experiment, participants were shown percentages of the 
trials in which they reacted correct, false or too late and were informed whether their 
performance fell within the 20 percent limit or not. Dependent on their accuracy, 
participants were paid one or two euros. The 20 percent limit that was used was 
calculated on the basis of a pilot study.
Results and discussion
The proportions of correct responses following correct responses and 
following incorrect responses were calculated. Two different types of errors could be 
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made by participants: Giving the wrong response and not giving a response within 
the time window. However, there was no significant difference in the pattern of 
results for responding incorrectly or responding late on the previous trial. These two 
prior responses were therefore pooled into one measure of responding incorrectly. 
To test our hypothesis regarding the optimal combination of action orientation and 
regulatory focus for performing the experimental task, the proportions of correct 
responses were subjected to a repeated measures ANOVA with the results of the 
previous trial (within participants), regulatory focus and action orientation (both 
between participants) as factors. 
Result of the previous trial had a significant main effect on proportion of 
correct responses, F (1, 57) = 16.06, p < .01, partial 2 = .22. In general, as 
expected, responses following previous correct ones were more likely to be correct 
(M = .68, SD = .14) than following previous incorrect ones (M = .62, SD = .18). No 
significant main effects of either action orientation (F < 1, ns.) or regulatory focus (F
(1, 57) = 1.87, p > .17) were found. The general interaction between action 
orientation and regulatory focus failed to reach significance (F (1, 57) = 3.14, p > .08) 
as did the interactions between previous result and action orientation and previous 
result and regulatory focus (both F’s < 1, ns.).
The analysis did reveal the predicted interaction of the result of the previous 
trial with regulatory focus and action orientation, F (1, 57) = 6.51, p < .02, partial 2 = 
.10. Looking at the more specific interactions within each type of result of the 
previous trial, the interaction between regulatory focus and action orientation was not 
significant for the responses made after a correct trial, F (1, 57) = 0.51, ns. Post-
correct performance was thus not influenced by action orientation, regulatory focus or 
by a combination of both, which is in agreement with our predictions. However, in the 
case of post-error performance a significant interaction between regulatory focus and 
action orientation emerged, F (1, 59) = 5.64, p = .02, partial 2 = .09. Simple effect 
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tests show that action-oriented participants in a promotion focus gave significantly 
more correct responses than action-oriented participants in a prevention focus or 
state-oriented participants with a promotion focus (see Table 1 for means). 
Additionally, accuracy did not differ for state-oriented individuals in a promotion or 
prevention focus, nor for participants in a prevention focus who were either action-or 
state-orientated. No main effects of either action orientation or regulatory focus were 
found (both Fs < 1.5, ns.). These results support our hypothesis regarding post-error 
performance. Action-oriented participants in a promotion focus demonstrate superior 
performance following errors compared to all other participants.3
The participants’ action orientation was measured at the end of the 
experiment, thereby risking contamination of this measure by the induced regulatory 
focus. Although we found no effect of the regulatory focus manipulation on the 
measured action orientation, F (1, 59) < 1, ns., this methodological flaw is remedied 
in the second experiment. 
Experiment 2
Because we predict an interaction between three variables in a study employing a 
newly developed paradigm and a rather complex design, a replication of the results is 
in order to substantiate our findings. Thus, in the second experiment, we aim to 
replicate the superior post-error performance by action-oriented individuals with an 
active promotion focus. In this replication, we use a different method to induce 
regulatory focus to test the robustness of our findings. 
Method
Participants and design. Sixty-two students (48 female) from the Radboud 
University of Nijmegen participated and received between 1.8 to 2.8 euros (see 
below) as compensation. The design of this experiment was a 2 (result of previous 
trial: correct vs. incorrect) x 2 (regulatory focus: promotion vs. prevention) x 2 (action 
orientation: action vs. state) mixed design. Result of the previous trial is a within-
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subjects factor whereas regulatory focus and action orientation are between-subjects
factors.
Procedure. Experiment 2 employed the same methodology as experiment 1, 
with three exceptions. The first change was the time of measuring the participants’ 
action orientation. This was done by presenting the Action Control Scale (Kuhl, 
1994b) at the start, rather than at the end of the experiment. The second change in 
methodology was the number of experimental trials. In the second experiment the 
participants completed three blocks of 60 trials, totaling 180 experimental trials.
The third change concerns the manner of manipulating regulatory focus. 
Participants received the same task instructions and practice phase as in experiment 
1. However, the instructions we used to manipulate regulatory focus differed. A 
promotion focus was induced by explaining that money could be gained or not gained 
per trial, whereas a prevention focus was induced by similar instructions explaining 
that money could be lost or not lost per trial. All participants were told that they would 
receive 1 euro for the experiment, irrespective of their performance. However, 
participants in a promotion focus were told that they could gain another conditional 
1.80 euros. For every correct response they would gain 0.01 euro, for every false or 
late response they would not gain money. This was reflected by the feedback these 
participants received after each trial. When a correct response was given, feedback 
consisted of “+ 0.01 €” written in a green color, whereas feedback consisted of “+ 
0.00 €” written in red when no or a false response was given. A prevention focus was 
induced by explaining participants that they would receive a conditional 1.80 euros 
for the experiment on top of the unconditional euro, but that they would lose 0.01 
euro for every false or late response, and not lose any money for every correct 
response. The feedback for prevention focused participants consisted of “- 0.00 €” in 
green when a correct response was given and “- 0.01 €” in red when no or a false 
response was given. Following each block of 60 trials, participants were informed of 
their performance so far and shown the amount of money gained/not lost. At the end 
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of the experiment, participants were informed of their performance and paid the 
amount of money they earned in the experiment, rounded up to the nearest 10 cent 
amount. 
Results and discussion
The proportion of correct responses was calculated, both following correct 
responses on the previous trial and following incorrect responses, or missing 
responses on the previous trial. Again, no difference was found in the pattern of 
results for responding incorrectly or not responding on the previous trial. These two 
prior responses were therefore pooled into one measure of responding incorrectly. 
Like in experiment 1, result of the previous trial had a significant main effect 
on proportion of correct responses, F (1, 58) = 15.94, p < .01, partial 2 = .22. In 
general, responses following previous correct ones were more likely to be correct (M
= .72, SD = .14) than following previous incorrect ones (M = .68, SD = .16). No 
significant main effects of either regulatory focus (F < 1, ns.) or action orientation (F 
(1, 58) = 3.58, p = .06) were found. The general interaction between action 
orientation and regulatory focus just failed to reach significance (F (1, 58) = 3.88, p = 
.06).  The interactions between previous result and action orientation (F < 1, ns.) and 
previous result and regulatory focus (F (1, 58) = 2.87, p = .10) were not significant 
either.
In contrast to the first experiment, we did not find a significant interaction 
between the result of the previous trial with regulatory focus and action orientation, F
(1, 58) = 1.16, p = .29. Failure to find this expected interaction was not due to the 
lack of the predicted pattern of results in post-error performance (see below). Rather, 
a similar, though non-significant pattern following correct trials was apparent in our 
results, F (1, 58) = 2.66, p = .11. This pattern explains the lack of the expected three-
way interaction (see also Table 2). 
However, the more specific and predicted interaction between action 
orientation and regulatory focus did reach significance when participants responded 
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incorrectly in the previous trial, F (1, 58) = 4.40, p = .04, partial 2 = .07. Simple effect 
tests show a similar pattern of responding following errors as found in the previous 
experiment: Action-oriented participants in a promotion focus gave significantly more 
correct responses than either action-oriented participants in a prevention focus or 
state-oriented participants in a promotion focus (see Table 2 for means). No 
differences in accuracy were found for state-oriented participants in either a 
promotion or prevention focus nor for participants in a prevention focus who were 
either action-or state-oriented.
These results seem to be very much in line with the results of the first 
experiment. In both experiments, action-oriented participants with an active 
promotion focus were most accurate in their post-error performance. To check 
whether the pattern of results we found in experiment 2 are similar to the pattern 
found in experiment 1, we performed a meta analysis on the results. 
Meta analysis
The data of the two experiments were pooled (N = 123) and analyzed in the same 
manner as reported above, with the addition of the between subjects factor study (1 
vs. 2). Supporting our hypothesis, the interaction of the result on the previous trial 
with regulatory focus and action orientation (AOF) was highly significant (F (1, 115) = 
7.22, p < .01, partial 2 = .06). The specific study did not have an effect on this 
interaction (F (1,115) = 1.94, p = .17, partial 2 = .02), indicating that the effects 
found in study 1 and 2 do not differ. 
The three-way interaction effect on task performance was driven by the 
interaction between regulatory focus and action orientation following incorrect trials 
(F (1, 115) = 10.04, p < .01, partial 2 = .08). This interaction was not significant after 
correct responses (F (1, 115) = 2.77, p = .10). Following incorrect trials, task 
performance by action-oriented participants with an active promotion focus was 
significantly better than the performance by action-oriented participants with an active 
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prevention focus (F (1, 121) = 11.50, p < .01) and better also than the performance of 
state-oriented participants in a promotion focus (F (1, 121) = 13.14, p < .01). Post-
error performance did not differ for state-oriented participants in either a promotion or 
a prevention focus (F (1, 121) = 1.89, p = .17), nor for prevention focused participants 
who were either action-or state-oriented (F (1, 121) = 1.10, p = .29).
Additionally, simple effects analyses showed that action-oriented individuals 
in a promotion focus do not suffer a loss of accuracy following incorrect trials. 
Accuracy following incorrect trials (.74) was as high as accuracy following correct 
trials (.75; t (29) = .50, ns.). All other combinations of action orientation and 
regulatory focus did lead to significant losses in accuracy following incorrect trials (all 
t’s > 3.36, all p’s < .01). No differences of any kind were found for performance 
following correct answers.
General discussion
Seneca’s full quote about erring reads “Errare humanum est. Perseverare 
diabolicum” or to err is human, to persist is diabolical. Seneca notwithstanding, the 
current study demonstrates that to persist in making mistakes is a very human 
property, at least in the domain of tasks requiring fast responses. The exception to 
this rule is formed by action-oriented individuals with a promotion focus. Individuals 
with this specific combination of dispositional affect regulation skills and active 
motivational orientation demonstrate optimal performance following errors when fast 
responses are required. To be more precise, in the current study the accuracy of 
responses on post-error trials diminishes, except for action-oriented individuals with a 
promotion focus who react as accurately after an error as after a correct response.
Our explanation with regard to the cause for the degraded performance in 
post-error functioning resides in the negative affect accompanying the error. Making 
a mistake activates negative affect, which makes attentional disengagement from the 
situation associated with the negative affect (i.e., the previous trial) difficult. This 
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impedes good performance in subsequent trials by occupying resources needed for 
task processing. 
It follows that there are two prerequisites to perform well despite making 
mistakes in time-pressured tasks. First, one needs effective affect regulatory skills to 
down-regulate the activated negative affect, thereby freeing resources for 
subsequent task performance. Secondly, to effectively use these resources, a 
motivation to achieve hits (and thereby being relatively unconcerned with mistakes) is 
needed. As the current study suggests, the unique combination providing these 
prerequisites is an action orientation combined with a promotion focus. Note that 
these results are restricted to the domain of time-pressured tasks, or tasks requiring 
quick changes in behavior. The negative affect activated by making mistakes may be 
very functional in other situations where one is able to analyze the cause of the 
mistake and possibly correct it (see also Koole, Kuhl, Jostmann, & Vohs, 2005). 
Behind this explanation lies our assumption that action- and state-oriented 
individuals differ in their flexibility regarding regulatory foci. Both state- and action-
oriented individuals may be able to activate either a promotion or a prevention focus, 
but it depends on specific situations how effective this motivational orientation can 
be. For state-oriented individuals, a promotion focus may provide the eagerness to 
score hits, but this will be functional only in relatively relaxed situations. In stressful 
situations, involving the activation of negative affect, a promotion focus may be 
active, but is likely to be ineffective. The activated negative affect is not down-
regulated effectively by state-oriented individuals, leading to distraction and 
rumination or at least attentional distraction from the task at hand (see also Baumann 
& Kuhl, 2002; Koole & Jostmann, 2004). In time-pressured tasks, such distraction 
clearly interferes with the eagerness of the active promotion focus leading to 
suboptimal performance. As the current research illustrates, action-oriented 
individuals are more flexible under stressful conditions. They are able to use the 
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eager response strategy of an active promotion focus because of the effective affect 
regulation, which prevents a lack of resources in post-error trials.
One might say that, at least in stressful situations, we found a specific kind of 
regulatory fit to exist between an action orientation and a promotion focus. In general, 
a fit between action orientation and regulatory focus could be of special importance 
when it comes to maintaining the active regulatory focus. Recent research suggests 
that eagerness to achieve a promotion goal is prolonged following success and 
diminished following failure, whereas the reverse holds for vigilance, a strategy for 
achieving prevention goals (see Förster et al., 2001; Idson, Liberman, & Higgins, 
2000). 
An action orientation may thus protect a promotion focus by down-regulating 
negative affect. Likewise, a state orientation may keep a prevention focus alive by 
eliciting rumination on events that are accompanied by negative affect. This fit 
between how one can and wants to regulate behavior may prove instrumental in 
maintaining a motivational focus. Although the existence of this particular type of 
regulatory fit is hypothetical at the moment, the importance of regulatory fit has been 
demonstrated in other domains. For example, fit between motivational focus and 
specific tasks has been shown to lead to higher efficiency of appraisals (Shah & 
Higgins, 2001), stronger motivation during goal pursuit (Higgins, 2000) and 
enjoyment of goal directed action (Freitas & Higgins, 2002; see also Keller & Bless, 
2008). We tentatively suggest that not just certain tasks may fit a certain regulatory 
focus, but that the regulatory focus may fit certain individuals. 
A procedural issue that needs to be discussed is the role of the error 
feedback that was provided to the participants. By providing error feedback, the 
question of whether the effects reflect a response to an error or to the error feedback 
is left open. We believe that it is the experience of making a mistake that activates 
negative affect and not the feedback. However, the feedback was necessary in the 
experimental task that was used to cause the experience of making mistakes. In 
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research using the classic flanker task, participants are generally aware of giving an 
incorrect response (see the error-related negativity research discussed below) since 
it is easy to ascertain a match or mismatch between the center symbol and flankers. 
The flanker task thus provides a rather simple visual discrimination task in 
comparison to the experimental task used in the current study. This experimental 
task was specifically designed to make the visual discrimination more difficult. 
Unfortunately, the task difficulty combined with the response window makes it much 
harder for a participant to detect the occurrence of an error. Our experimental task 
thus makes giving feedback on the responses necessary, and thereby leaves the 
question whether the obtained effects are caused by a response to the error or to the 
feedback unanswered.
We think the current behavioral effects, moderated by action orientation and 
motivational focus, are linked to the psychophysiological literature on action 
monitoring, which has explored how errors influence brain activity. Typically, a neural 
response to an error is found in the medio frontal cortex (anterior cingulate cortex or 
ACC), consisting of a sharp negative deflection in the event-related brain potential. 
This neural response reaches its peak approximately 100 ms following making an 
error and is termed error-related negativity (ERN or Ne; Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, 
Hoorman, & Blanke, 1990; Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993). The 
exact interpretation of what ERN reflects remains a matter of discussion (for a review 
and integration see Yeung, 2004) but it is clear that errors (as well as feedback 
indicating errors; Miltner, Braun, & Coles, 1997) evoke brain activity generated in the 
ACC that may be responsible for subsequent deteriorated performance.
As subject of an ongoing debate, ERN is interpreted cognitively, as well as 
affectively. One well researched cognitive interpretation entails that ERN signals 
conflict between two responses; the erroneous one and the error-correcting one 
(e.g., Yeung, Cohen, & Botvinick, 2004). However, affective interpretations have 
recently received much attention as well. To illustrate, Gehring and Knight (2000) 
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state that “[a] model consistent with our data posits that the activity reflected in the 
ERN represents an affective or motivational signal. The signal could serve an alerting 
function that mobilized affective systems rather than immediate corrective action…” 
(p. 519). This view is consistent with our perspective and recent work on ERN and 
ACC-activity (e.g., Hajcak & Foti, 2008; Luu et al., 2000). We do not posit that these 
interpretations are mutually exclusive; both mechanisms could operate jointly to steer 
our behavior in the right direction under conditions of stress or errors. Indeed, the 
ACC is thought to be an ideal location in which cognitive and affective information is 
integrated and responded to (Bush et al., 2000). 
With regards to explaining the current results, we think the affective 
interpretation fits well with our data and theorizing. However, it should be noted that 
the current study does not provide direct evidence for the mediating role of affect 
and, therefore, alternative explanations cannot be excluded. For example, the conflict 
monitoring explanation for the ERN discussed above, has also been used to explain 
post-error slowing (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). Although this 
conflict monitoring account is well established, it does not incorporate affect 
regulation processes that play a pivotal role in the theory of action and state 
orientation (see e.g., Jostmann et al., 2005; Koole & Jostmann, 2004; Kuhl, 1994a). 
In a similar vein, affect also plays an important role in motivational theories such as 
regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997). Thus, although a conflict monitoring account 
seems capable of explaining post-error performance in general, the specific 
interaction effect between action orientation and regulatory focus obtained in the 
current study strongly suggests an affective account. For the time being, no plausible 
or more parsimonious explanation for the results of the current study seems available 
than one which accommodates for the affective consequences of making a mistake. 
In research on the ERN and post-error behavior Gehring and Knight (2000) explicitly 
acknowledge the possible role of affect in post-error performance by stating that  “… 
the ERN could actually be a composite of several signals […] influencing affective 
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responses and […] compensatory motor behavior.” (p. 519).  Nonetheless, our 
theoretical affective explanation alone will not suffice and future research should 
specifically aim to demonstrate that the regulation of negative affect indeed plays this 
central role in predicting post-error behavior.
When it comes to integration of research domains, the current paradigm may 
prove valuable to link ERN research to work on action orientation and motivation. In 
studies on ERN, behavioral measures are not the main interest, although post-error 
slowing is sometimes reported (e.g., De Bruin, Mars, & Hulstijn, 2004; Hajcak, 
McDonald, & Simmons, 2003; Holroyd, Yeung, Coles, & Cohen, 2005). However, 
none of these studies reporting post-error slowing explicitly demonstrate a link 
between ERN-amplitude and behavioral effects. Studies on ERN usually focus on the 
amplitude of the ERN as a measure of the impact an error has on the individual. For 
example, the amplitude of the ERN increases when errors are more significant, for 
instance when accuracy is important (e.g., Hajcak, Moser, Yeung, & Simons, 2005). 
Also, ERN-amplitude following errors has been shown to be moderated by individual 
differences. For example, larger ERN amplitudes were found for students scoring 
high on negative mood states (or negative affect (NA), Hajcak et al., 2004; Luu et al., 
2000), neuroticism (Luu et al., 2000) and for students scoring high on anxiety and 
worry scales (Hajcak et al., 2003) or obsessive-compulsiveness (Hajcak & Simons, 
2002).
Although these moderators may encompass both components, some seem to 
involve heightened sensitivity to negative affect whereas others may be associated 
with difficulties in affect regulation. It is interesting to note that such factors related to 
affect regulation show conceptual overlap with the theory of action orientation. 
Specifically, ERN amplitude seems to be influenced by personality factors that show 
overlap with high levels of state orientation (e.g., see Kuhl, 1994a, for overlap and 
interrelations between anxiety, neuroticism, obsessive-compulsiveness and state 
orientation, see also Baumann & Kuhl, 2002). This overlap between factors 
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influencing ERN and state orientation provides further evidence for the idea that the 
concept of action orientation is highly useful in thinking about post-error processes, 
both in the form of brain activity and behavior. Action orientation may actually be 
more useful in studying task related post-error processes than the more broad 
personality factors used thus far, since it is assumed to be more closely tied to 
performance (see e.g., Diefendorff, Hall, Lord, & Strean, 2000). The specific 
paradigm we used may prove useful to further investigate the relation between 
individual differences, ERN and the behavioral consequences of making mistakes.
In the second experiment, the predicted three-way interaction failed to reach 
significance due to the fact that the non-significant pattern of means in the post-
correct condition was similar to the significant (and predicted) pattern in the post-
error condition. The meta-analysis suggests that we may, nevertheless, conclude 
that across the two experiments there was a significant three-way interaction and, 
because there was no significant interaction with experiment, the observed pattern 
did not differ between experiments. Theoretically, there is a somewhat speculative 
explanation for the weak pattern of means in the post-correct condition entailing, just 
like in the post-error condition, slightly better performance of action oriented 
participants in the promotion focus condition. Recently, a Correct-Response 
Negativity (CRN) effect was obtained, a negative deflection resembling ERN (Vidal, 
Hasbroucq, Grapperon, & Bonnet, 2000). Although the functionality of CRN is at this 
moment unknown, both ERN and CRN are thought to be involved in response 
monitoring (e.g., Hajcak et al., 2005). Furthermore, it seems that error and correct 
responses are processed more similarly under conditions of uncertainty, leading to 
similar patterns in ERN and CRN (Pailing & Segalowitz, 2005). Thus, the pattern we 
demonstrate to exist in post error task performance may be found in post correct 
performance as well when uncertainty about performance exists. Because in 
experiment 2 there was a trial-by-trial contingency of performance and pay-off, 
participants may have been acutely aware of the implications of making mistakes, 
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which may have induced a higher level of performance uncertainty than in 
experiment 1. This may have caused the weak CRN pattern in the post-correct 
condition in experiment 2. However, given the fact that little is known about the 
functionality of the CRN, this reasoning remains highly speculative.
Coda
The current study demonstrates that errors do not affect every person in the 
same manner. Dispositional differences in action orientation and situationally 
activated regulatory focus interact in predicting post-error performance. Though 
some may be destined to dwell on their mistakes and on that account suffer future 
performance deficits, others more readily move on and, given the right motivation, 
keep performing at the peak of their ability.
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Notes
1. Note that a state orientation disrupts task performance only during stressful or very 
demanding conditions. Performance does not suffer disruption under normal 
conditions wherein state-oriented individuals may even outperform action-oriented 
individuals (Koole, Kuhl, Jostmann, & Vohs, 2005; see also Diefendorff, Hall, Lord, & 
Strean, 2000).
2. In preliminary studies, we employed the classic flanker paradigm to investigate the 
effects of motivation and action orientation on performance following errors. We 
found the typical flanker effects, but in no study did we find effects on performance 
following errors. The flanker task is probably too easy to leave room for the influence 
of motivation and/or dispositional factors. We therefore devised a more difficult 
adaptation of the flanker paradigm, with a more complex decision criterion and longer 
inter-trial intervals.
3. Although the experimental paradigm employed a response window, we did 
analyze logarithmically transformed response latencies to check for effects using a 
repeated measures ANOVA with the results of the previous trial (within participants), 
regulatory focus and action orientation as factors. However, in both experiments, no 
main or interaction effects on these response latencies reached significance.
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
To Err is Human 31
Table 1
Mean proportion of correct responses on the current trial following incorrect or correct 
responses on the previous trial as a function of regulatory focus and action 
orientation in Study 1 (with standard deviations in parentheses)
Following incorrect responses Following correct responses
State Action State Action 
Promotion 58 (20) a 71 (18) b 70 (15) b 72 (14) b
Prevention 63 (14) a* 56 (16) a 67 (11)b* 65 (14) b
Note. Means with different subscripts differ significantly from each other. The means 
marked with an asterisk differ on a marginally significant level (p < .07).
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
To Err is Human 32
Table 2
Mean proportion of correct responses on the current trial following an incorrect 
response on the previous trial as a function of regulatory focus and action orientation  
in Study 2 (with standard deviations in parentheses)
Following incorrect responses Following correct responses
State Action State Action 
Promotion 61 (20)a* 77 (14)b 66 (17)c* 78 (10)b
Prevention 67 (15)a 66 (13)a 73 (16)bc 73 (12)b
Note. Means with different subscripts differ significantly from each other. The means 
marked with an asterisk differ on a marginally significant level (p < .06).
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Figure 1. Examples of letter grids used in experiment 1 and 2. 
 
